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When sued, the Japanese government always wins.  At least,
almost always.  Year in and year out, roughly 75-95 percent of
the time it wins.  The question is why.  By the occasional word
on the street in Japan, it wins because it cheats -- because it
manipulates the judicial apparatus to obtain decisions biased in
its favor.
Crucial to this claim, judges in the lower courts in Japan,
like judges in most countries outside the United States, work as
career civil servants.  They begin their careers as judges,
remain so for most of their working lives, and retire as judges.
During that time, they work under the supervision of the
administrative office of the lower courts, the Secretariat.  The
Secretariat answers to the Supreme Court justices, and the
justices are appointed by the Cabinet.  At the behest of the
Secretariat, the lower-court judges then move up and down the
judicial hierarchy and all around the country.  Through this
indirect influence over judicial careers, the Japanese Cabinet
thus has the power to reward and punish judges by the complexion
of the opinions they write.  The question is whether -- or when -
- it uses it.
Even if the government did manipulate judicial careers, the
connection to verdict rates would remain problematic.  AccordingRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 3
to the well-known Priest-Klein hypothesis,1 judicial bias should
have nothing to do with such rates.  If Priest and Klein are
right (as we believe they are) the word on the street is wrong.
Put simply, Priest and Klein point out that if a judge is biased
in favor of the government, the government may be emboldended to
bring shakier cases.  If so, then ultimately its verdict rate may
look no better than if it faced unbiased judges.  The Secretariat
might or might not be manipulating judicial careers, but from
verdict rates we would not be able to tell.
Rather than rest on this logic, we use data from tax
litigation to test directly whether the Secretariat punishes
judges for deciding against the government.  More specifically,
we combine data on the careers of individual judges with data on
the opinions they write.  We then ask whether (holding constant a
variety of other factors) judges who decide cases in favor of the
government do better than those who favor taxpayers.
We have used this technique elsewhere, and found that it
captures a wide array of influences on judicial careers in Japan.
For example,
 i.  Judges from elite schools have more successful careers
     than others.2
                    
1 George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).
2 J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a
Civil Law Regime:  The Evidence from Japan, 13 J. Law, Econ. & Org.259,
274 tab. 3 (1997); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese
Conviction Rate Is so High (Working Paper, Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University; Working Paper, John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics and Business, Harvard Law school, 1998).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 4
ii.  Judges who flunked the Japanese bar-exam-equivalent (the
pass rates hovers between 1 and 4 percent; this is the LRTI
entrance exam, described below) fewer times have more
successful careers than those who flunked it more often.3
iii. Judges who in the 1960s joined a leftist bar group (the YJL,
described below) had less successful careers than those who
did not.4
iv.  Judges who acquit defendants do worse than those who always
convict.5
 v.  Judges who held unconstitutional a section of the electoral
law favorable to the ruling party did worse than those who
held it constitutional.6
Here, we ask a similar question:  do judges who favor taxpayers
have less successful careers than those who always favor the
government?
Although we find that tax opinions affect a judge's career,
the Secretariat does not punish judges for writing pro-taxpayer
opinions.  In fact, judges who write pro-taxpayer opinions do no
worse in their careers than those who favor the government.
Rather, the Secretariat punishes judges for writing wrong
opinions.  On average, a judge who finds a tax opinion reversed
on appeal will spend more time in provincial branch offices and
less time with prestigious administrative responsibilities.
Even stronger, a judge who rules for the taxpayer and has the
                    
3 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 2 (1997), at 274 tab. 3, 277
tab. 5.
4 Id., at 277 tab. 5.
5 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note  2 (1998).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 5
ruling affirmed on appeal is less likely than average to end up
in a branch office.  Simply being pro-taxpayer is not the judge’s
problem; getting reversed is.
This leaves two questions:  (i) if the Secretariat does not
punish judges for favoring taxpayers, why is the verdict rate so
high?, and (ii) if the government could manipulate judicial
careers to win cases, why does it not do so?  On the first
question, one possibility is clear:  the high verdict rate may
reflect a rational case selection strategy by the government.  As
a repeat player in the courts, perhaps the government
disproportionately chooses to litigate those disputes most likely
to move precedent in an advantageous direction.
The second question is harder.  If the government could
manipulate judicial careers to win, why does it not do so?  Given
the additional tax revenues it could earn by subtly altering
judicial incentives, is it leaving money on the table?  We
conclude this article by explaining how the reason for the dogged
independence of the courts on this score may lie in the political
economy of Japanese electoral competition.
We begin by detailing the verdict rates in Japan, explaining
the court structure, outlining the common reaction to the
phenomenon, and noting the implications of Priest-Klein (Section
I).  We then use data from reported opinions and judicial careers
to test whether the Secretariat uses its control over judicial
                                                            
6 Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 2 (1997), at 285 tab. 9.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 6
appointments to reward pro-government opinions (Section II).  We
conclude by exploring the political economy of judicial
manipulation and electoral competition (Section III).
I.  The Problem
A.  The Rates:
In 1994, Japanese district courts decided 154 civil disputes
between taxpayers and the government.  Of these, the government
won 94 percent.  The government also litigated another 622 non-
tax administrative cases.  Of those, it won 93 percent.7  This is
not unusual.  Year after year, the government wins by similar
odds.8
Because the Japanese government publishes a relatively high
proportion of the tax opinions, the verdict rate among published
opinions tends to track the total.  Given that the case reporters
had apparently not yet finished publishing 1994 opinions at the
time of our writing, take the 1989 opinions.  That year, the
government litigated 182 tax cases and won 87 percent.  It
litigated another 355 non-tax administrative cases and won 90
                    
7 Saiko saiban sho, Shiho tokei nempo [Annual Report of Judicial
Statistics] tab. 80 (Tokyo:  Hoso kai, 1994).
8 J. Mark Ramseyer, Kokuzeicho wa naze katsuka:  “Ho to
keizaigaku” kara mita shoso ritsu [Why the National Tax Office Wins:
Verdict Rates from a “Law & Economics” Perspective], 934 Jurisuto 130
(1989); J. Mark Ramseyer, Ho to keizaigaku:  Nihon ho no keizai bunseki
[Law & Economics:  An Economic Analysis of Japanese Law] ch. 3 (Tokyo:
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percent.9  Of the tax cases, 92 were published (51 percent,
including both civil and criminal tax cases).  Of those published
cases, the government won 92 percent.  Thus, the win rates on
published and unpublished tax cases are almost identical.
B.  Japanese Courts:
The puzzle is what to make of these high government win
rates.  For its critics, the government wins because it
manipulates the courts to bias them in its favor.  It can do so,
they explain, because of the career structure of the judiciary.
Because it hires young and unproven jurists into the court, it
manipulates career paths to induce them to work carefully and
hard.  Argue the critics, it also uses that career path to induce
them to favor the government.10
To understand how the government can intervene in the
courts, consider the structure of the Japanese judiciary.11
During most of the post-war decades, the conservative Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) controlled the Japanese Parliament.  As
majority party, it also controlled appointments to the 15-member
Supreme Court.  As a moderately conservative party facing a
socialist and communist opposition, it primarily appointed
                    
9 Saiko, supra note 7, at tab. 80 (1989).
10 An argument we ourselves have made.  See Ramseyer & Rasmusen,
supra note 2 (1997), at 280-82.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 8
moderately conservative justices.  To prevent justices from
shifting their ideology during their tenure, it appointed them
late enough in life that they did not have time to shift --
generally in their early 60s, shortly before the mandatory
retirement age of 70.  The LDP felt safe in doing so because it
had a secure hold on Parliament for most of this period; the
suspense in Japanese politics was in which faction of the LDP
would hold power, not in whether the party itself would appoint
the next judge.
Typically, the Cabinet names a majority of Supreme Court
justices from the lower courts.  Generally, it has kept on the
bench at least one justice who earlier ran the Secretariat and
knows the intricacies of administering judicial careers.  In
turn, these Supreme Court justices supervise the Secretariat.
Cruial to the discussion here, Japanese lower court judges
do not sit in one court for most of their careers.  Instead, they
join the courts straight out of law school.  They then move
around the country at 3-year intervals.  At the behest of the
Secretariat, they move from court to court -- from the desireable
metropolitan courts to rural branch offices, from courts of
appeal to family courts, from jobs with prestigious
administrative responsibilities to jobs without.
                                                            
11 See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 2 (1997); J. Mark
Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace chs.
8-9 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1993).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 9
Nominally, all judges are created equal.  In fact, some are
noticeably more equal than others.  Some judges spend many years
in the coveted metropolitan courts, spend few years in the widely
despised branch offices, and carry prestigious administrative
responsibilities.  Others toil long years in small-town branch
offices, with rarely a stint in the cities or on non-judicial
work.  The Secretariat promotes judges at different rates because
it hires them before it has good information about their
abilities and work habits.  Because not all are congenital
workaholics, it tries to reward care and effort.  Because not all
are brilliant — though remember that the LRTI examination is one
of the toughest in any profession in any country -- it tries to
give the brightest the most responsible jobs.
C.  Explanations:
For high government verdict rates, there seems a
straightforward explanation:  the government rewards  pro-
government judges.  Yet more than a decade after the Priest-Klein
hypothesis, one should wonder.  Even if the courts relentlessly
favored the government, rational taxpayers and bureaucrats would
take that bias into account when they bargained.  If they did,
the bias would shape the terms of their out-of-court settlements.
It would not, however, affect the government's rate of victory
among the few cases that proceeded to litigation.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 10
By the original Priest-Klein hypothesis, legal bias or no
observed verdict rates should hover around 50 percent.
Researchers since have failed to confirm this 50 percent
hypothesis.12  They have, however, left intact the intuition that
legal bias will not correlate with verdict rates.  If so, the
Japanese tax office may win consistently -- but that verdict rate
is no evidence of biased judicial incentives.
Instead, one of the more straightforward reasons for the
high government win rates in Japan is a repeat-player strategy.13
Suppose one party faces repeated disputes over similar issues.
Suppose further that judges generally follow precedent, and
change precedent only reluctantly.  If so, then repeat players
will disproportionately select for litigation those cases where
they see a good chance of shifting the law in their favor.  As
Priest and Klein observed, a "systematic difference in stakes to
the parties" will cause the observed verdict to differ from 50
percent.14  The Japanese tax office is exactly such a repeat
player.  Presumably, it adopts exactly such a litigation
strategy.
                    
12 E.g., D. Kessler, T. Meites & G. Miller, Explaining Deviations
from the Fifty-Percent Rule:  A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of
Cases for Litigation, 25 J. Legal Stud. 233 (1996); Joel Waldfogel, The
Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff
Victory, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 229 (1995).
13 Ramseyer, supra note; Ramseyer, supra note, at ch 3.
14 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 40.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 11
As data consistent with this hypothesis (inconclusive to be
sure), compare the verdict rates of national and municipal
governments.15  As Table 1 shows, the national government tends
to win at a higher rate than local governments.16  Given the
different incentives that national and local governments face,
the phenomenon is consistent with rational levels of investment
in precedent.  Unlike the national government, local governments
face a collective action problem:  should any one government
invest in the litigation that produces favorable precedent, much
of the gain will accrue to other local governments.  As a result,
one would expect the national government to invest more heavily
in precedent -- and higher national verdict rates would result.
The government also maintains a case publication policy that
suggests an interest in tax precedent.  In tax but not in most
fields, it publishes a high percentage of district court
opinions.  In most civil litigation, the government publishes
officially only a small percentage of the lower court opinions.
In tax, however, it maintains an official reporter devoted
                    
15 The data are ultimately inconclusive because (i) the Japanese
government faces some limits (often not binding) on its ability to
settle disputes, and (ii) the courts tend to give broader discretion to
national than to local bureaucrats.  On the legality of settlements by
the government, compare K.K. Nishizawa v. Nagasaki kenshiji, 12 Gyösai
reishü 2505 (Nagasaki D. Ct. Feb. 3, 1961) (may settle) with Sasakawa
takushoku ringyö, K.K., 7 Kakyü minshü 1895 (Tokyo D. Ct. July 14, 1956)
(may not settle); for a contrary interpretation of the data in Table 1,
see Ramseyer & Nakazato (1998: ch. 8).
16 Xxx We’ll want to do a formal statistical test for equality of
tw binomial probabilities, which will probabl confirm this conclusion,
since the sample size is so big.  .Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 12
exclusively to the field.  Of the 182 non-criminal tax cases
litigated in 1989, xxx appeared in an official reporter.17
                    
17 To be sure, many of these cases involved primarily factual
cases, necessarily disputes with less precedential value.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 13
Table 1:
Verdict Rates, by Government Sued
                 A. National        B.  Local
            Government         Government         B/A
1986  9.16 (251)  6.25  (64)         .68
1987 10.43 (211) 14.00  (50) 1.34
1988  7.20 (250) 19.23  (52) 2.67
1989  9.16 (273) 12.20  (82) 1.33
1990  7.93 (353)  6.10  (82)  .77
1991  9.46 (296)  9.46  (74) 1.00
1992 11.01 (318)  9.68  (93)  .88
1993  7.41 (432)  7.56 (119) 1.02
1994  6.30 (492) 13.08 (130) 2.08
1995         10.30 (369)        14.73 (129)        1.43
Total:  8.63 (3245) 11.09 (875) 1.29
Notes:  The percentage of petitioner wins in suits resulting
in an opinion (hanketsu) is followed by the total number of suits
in parenthesis.
Suits against the local government are those listed as chihö
jichi (regional self-government) suits in the national data.
Suits against the national government are all other non-tax
suits.
Source:  Saikö saibansho jimu sökyoku (ed.), Shihö tökei
nempö:  minji, gyösei hen [Court Statistics Annual:  Civil and
Administrative] tab. 80 (Tokyo:  Hösö kai, various years).
_________________________________________________________________
II.  The Test
A.  Introduction:
On whether judges who publish opinions favoring taxpayers do
indeed do worse than others, consider three independent
hypotheses.  First, if the word-on-the-street in Japan is right,
then a judge who writes pro-taxpayer opinions incurs a non-Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 14
trivial risk of damaging his career.18   This may not show up in
every career, but disproportionately, such judges should receive
worse assignments than those who favor the government.
Second, the government could have a high win rate simply
because it avoids risking unfavorable precedents.  A judge who
favors taxpayers should then suffer no career damage.
      Third, at least hypothetically, a judge might be rewarded
for ruling against the government -- perhaps because powerful
taxpayers pressure the government to punish judges who rule
against them.19
Finally, suppose the Secretariat tries to reward judicial
accuracy among lower-court judges.  Should a judge write an
opinion that is wrong, he will receive worse assignments, whether
he be pro-government or pro-taxpayer.  This hypothesis is
independent of the first three, which are themselves mutually
exclusive.
To test these various hypotheses we estimate the quality of
a judge's post-tax-opinion job postings y through the regression
equation:
                    
18 A suggestion we ourselves have made.  See Ramseyer & Rasmusen,
supra note 2 (1997), at 280-82.
19 Obviously, this is not an explanation for the high pro-
government verdict rate.  Moreover, we do not know of anyone who has
suggested that this is the case in Japan.  It is, however, a plausible
scenario for the United States, where the Internal Revenue Service is
frequently under attack from a Congress lobbied by influential
constituents who would like to pay less taxes. See, for example,
Associated Press, IRS Chief Tells Senate Panel He will Probe “Every
Allegation,” Buffalo News, May 1, 1998, Pg. 6A.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 15
y = a + ß1X1 + ß2X2 + e.
Here, X1 is a vector of variables relating to the judge's tax
opinions, including whether he favors the government (to
distinguish among our first three hypotheses) and whether he is
reversed (to test the fourth hypothesis).  X2 is a vector of
control variables related to the judge's seniority, political
inclinations, intelligence, and effort.  We would expect these to
matter under any of the explanations but we control for them lest
we confuse the effect of tax dispute variables with that of
coincidental talent and political bias.
B.  The Data:
We code a tax case according to whether the taxpayer or the
government won, whether the case was appealed, and whether it was
reversed on appeal.20  For each judge involved, we also collect
data about the jobs he held for the ten years before and after
the year of the decision.  We add to this other potentially
relevant variables, primarily proxies for intelligence and
effort.
For our database, we examine all published cases (whether
civil or criminal) that construe either the Income Tax Act (for
                    
20 We treat a case as a taxpayer victory if the court adopted any
or all of the taxpayer’s position.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 16
individual taxpayers) or the Corporate Tax Act (for firms).21  We
locate these cases on the Hanrei takei data base, available on
nine or ten CD-ROM diskettes.22  Analogous to Lexis and Westlaw,
the dataset includes virtually all pubished opinions.  For data
on judicial careers, we used the Zensaibankan keireki soran.23
The book covers all job postings for all judges educated since
the war.  For membership in the YJL, we examined Osorubeki
saiban.24  It includes the YJL roster for 1969, taken from
League's own roster.
We use this material to assemble two samples.  These can be
used in combination for some purposes but must be used separately
for others.  First, for the “Tax Trials” dataset, we examine all
district court tax cases published in either 1976 or 1979.  We
located 113 tax opinions for 1976 and 116 for 1979.  Because some
judges wrote several tax opinions, this produced a set of 179
judges who wrote at least one tax opinion in either of the 2
                    
21 We include criminal tax cases (there were 33 cases, 2 with
acquittals) because we believe the case selection dynamic in tax fraud
cases is often close to that of civil tax cases.  We dropped judges not
in the data souce (primarily judges educated before the war and
prosecutors seconded to the courts) and judges who joined the bench less
than a year before the year of the decision or who quit less than 2
years after the year of the decision.  Where a judge who opinions in
both 1976 and 1979, we coded the career data based on the year in which
he decided a pro-taxpayer decision.  If he wrote a pro-taxpayer decision
in both or neither of the two years, we based the career data on 1979.
22 Daiichi hoki, ed., Hanrei taikei CD-ROM [A Systematic Case law:
CD-ROM] (Tokyo:  Daiichi hoki, biannually updated).
23 ZSKS, supra note.
24 Shiso undo kenkyu sho, ed., Osorubeki saiban [Fearsome Trials]
(Tokyo:  Zenbo sha, 1969).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 17
years.  We chose years in the late 1970s because (at the time we
began collecting the material) our data on judicial careers
expired in 1990 and we need ten years of post-opinion career
data.25
We chose two years that were three years apart because doing
so yielded two cohorts with little overlap, given that most
judges are reassigned every three years.  Note that some judges
specialize by subject matter during a 3-year assignment --
including tax.  Rarely, however, do judges write many tax
opinions for more than three years in a row.  Note further that
most tax cases are heard by three-judge panels, even in the lower
courts, that all Japanese trials are bench trials, and that lower
courts never publish dissents.
Second, in the “Tax Appeals” sample, we collected data on
those trial court decisions that were appealed, but over a longer
time horizon.  We included all the appealed cases in 1976 and
1979, since we already had them from the Tax Trials sample.  We
added to that all cases reported for the other years between 1975
and 1984 in which either (a) the trial judge was reversed on
appeal or (b) a pro-taxpayer opinion was affirmed (a total of 78
cases).  Finally, we collected a random sample of 78 pro-
government opinions written during those years and affirmed on
appeal. This is by far the most common kind of appeals case.
                    
25 Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, ed., Zen saibankan keireki
soran:  kaitei shinban [Biographical Information on All Judges:  NewRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 18
Because of the high cost of collecting this data, we used this
simple form of stratified sampling to concentrate on the most
interesting data.26
                                                            
Revised Edition] (Tokyo:  Konin sha, 1990) (hereinafter cited as ZSKS).
The 1998 revision to this book now extends the data to the late 1990s.
26 We used the following sampling procedure. Ramseyer determined
how many cases in a given year had TP_AFF, TP_REV, or J_REV equal to 1,
and all of those went into the sample—9 cases for 1975, for example. He
then numbered the cases that year with J_AFF equal to 1—37 of them for
1975. Rasmusen then used STATA to generate 9 different random numbers
from 1 to 37, and Ramseyer used those J_AFF cases for our sample. Thus,
we end up sampling the same numbers of J_AFF cases as all other cases
for each year except for 1976 and 1979, for which our sample was the
entire population of tax cases.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 19
Table 2a:  Summary Statistics for the Tax Trial Sample
               Min     Median     Mean            Max
ANYPROTP  0        0      .34  1
ANYREV  0        0   .09   1
PREGOODJOB  0        0   .20  1
POSTGOODJOB  0        .27   .34   1
PREBADJOB  0        0   .16  .73
POSTBADJOB  0        .20   .22  .85
SENIORITY 2        13       13.52           29
FLUNKS  0        3  4.03 17
ELITE_UNIV  0        0   .39  1
1ST_TOKYO  0        0   .10  1
OPINIONS/YR  0       1.85  2.88       20.6
YJL  0        0   .07  1
     Number of judges:  179
Table 2b:
Summary Statistics for the Tax Appeal Sample
               Min     Median     Mean           Max
TP_AFF  0        0        .11 (.19)  1
TP_REV  0        0        .15 (.26)    1
J_AFF  0        1        .70 (.45)    1
J_REV  0        0   .12 (.20)  1
PREGOODJOB  0        0   .17 (.17)  1
POSTGOODJOB  0        .19   .33 (.33)       1
PREBADJOB  0        0   .18  (.11)      .81
POSTBADJOB  0        .20   .24 (.24)      .97
SENIORITY  2       12  12.93 (12.93) 31
FLUNKS  0        3  4.01 (4.01) 17
ELITE_UNIV  0        0   .36 (.36)  1
1ST_TOKYO  0        0   .12 (.12)  1
OPINIONS/YR  0       1.90  2.91 (2.91)    29.02
YJL  0        0   .06  (.06)  1Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 20
     Notes:
     Number of judges:  284.
     This is a stratified sample. The values weighted to
estimate the population values are followed in parentheses
by the unweighted, sample values. For the median, weighting
happens not to alter the values. For the Min and Max,
weighting makes no difference, and population values are not
estimated.
C.  The Variables:
Using this data, we constructed the following variables.
Where relevant, we note the predicted effect that these variables
will have on judicial careers.27  Summary statistics appear in
Table 2.
ANYPROTP: This equals 1 if a judge published a tax opinion
(in 1976 or 1979, depending on the judicial cohort) in which the
government lost on any count; 0 otherwise.
ANYREV:  This equals 1 if a judge published a tax opinion in
a reference year (1976 or 1979) that was reversed on any issue; 0
otherwise.
PREGOODJOB:  The percentage of the 10 years before the
reference year in which the judges either was chief judge, had
sokatsu responsibilities (a modestly prestigious administrative
appointment), or was in another administrative post.
POSTGOODJOB:  Equivalent to PREGOODJOB for the 10 years
after the reference year.
                    
27 Based on earlier research.  See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note
2 (1997); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 2 (1998).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 21
PREBADJOB:  The percentage of the 10 years before the
reference year in which the judge was in a branch office.
POSTBADJOB:  Equivalent to PREBADJOB for the 10 years after
the reference year.
SENIORITY:   The number of years between the reference year
and the year of the judge’s  graduating class  from  the national
law school, the Legal Research & Training Institute (LRTI).
Class 10 would have graduated in 1958, Class 20 in 1968, and so
forth.  All else equal, as judges rise in seniority they obtain
better jobs.  As a result, SENIORITY should correlate positively
with POSTGOODJOB and negatively with POSTBADJOB.
FLUNKS:  This is the estimated number of years between a
judge's reaching age 22 and his entrance to the LRTI.  To become
a lawyer, judge or prosecutor, a college graduate must first
graduate from the LRTI.  During the years under study here, the
LRTI maintained an entrance exam with a pass rate that varied
between about 1 and 4 percent.  As a result, most applicants
never passed, and most who did passed only after failing several
years first.
In effect, FLUNKS approximates the number of times the judge
failed the LRTI entrance exam.  Hence, it proxies for a
combination of IQ and hard work.  All else equal, the smarter and
harder working judges (the judges with the lowest FLUNKS scores)
will tend to obtain the better job postings.  Thus, FLUNKS shouldRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 22
correlate positively with POSTBADJOB and negatively with
POSTGOODJOB.
ELITE_UNIV:  This equals 1 if a judge graduated from either
of the two top-ranked universities, the University of Tokyo or
the University of Kyoto.  All else equal, graduation from these
schools correlates with initial appointment to the best jobs in
the courts.
OPINIONS/YR:  The number of opinions authored or co-authored
by the judge during the 10 years before the reference year,
divided by the number of years he was on the bench during that
time.  All else equal, OPINIONS/YR should correlate positively
with time in the better jobs.
YJL:  This equals 1 if a judge was a member of the YJL in
1969; 0 otherwise.  The YJL was a leftist organization among
lawyers, judges and law professors -- consider it the Japanese
National-Lawyers-Guild-equivalent.  All else equal, membership in
the YJL  in 1969 correlates with less prestigious postings.
1ST_TOKYO:  This equals 1 if a judge's first job was in the
Tokyo District Court; 0 otherwise.  When it hires a new cohort of
judges, the Secretariat distinguishes among them on the basis of
observed industry and intelligence.  It then places the most able
on a distinct fast track.  The clearest signal of that fast-track
status is appointment to the Tokyo District Court as a judge's
first job.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 23
D.  The Results:
1.  Preliminary considerations:  We performed three sets of
regressions:  (1) preliminary regressions illustrating the
determinants of early or intermediate judicial careers (on both
samples combined), (2) regressions examining the effects of pro-
taxpayer opinions and of reversals (on the Tax Trials sample),
and (3) regressions testing for differences between pro-
government and pro-taxpayer reversals (on the Tax Appeals
sample).28
In the first set, we examine the determinants of a judge’s
early or intermediate career.  As we are unaware of any relevant
bias that would result from merging the two data sets, we combine
them here.  Eliminating dublicate entries results in a data set
with xx judges.  Regressions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.329 in Table 3 give
the results; the dependent variables are 1
ST-TOKYO, PREBADJOB,
and PREGOODJOB.
By the word on the street, the Secretariat identifies the
most promising new recruits and assigns them to the Tokyo
District Court for their first job.  Only three of our control
variables are relevant to this initial appointment, and the
                    
28  Note that the Trials sample has 179 observations, the Appeals
sample has 329 observations, and the combined sample has 335
observations. The number of observations in the first two samples  adds
up to more than  335 because there is some overlap between the Trials
and Appeals samples.
29 The regressions in Table 3 are not weighted by sampling
probability.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 24
regression shows that having gone to an elite university and
having graduated from LRTI at a young age (and hence having
likely failed the entrance examination fewer times) both confer
significant advantage.  Having been a member of the YJL, on the
other hand, is not statistically significant.30
Regressions (3.2) and (3.3) illustrate some of the factors
that determine the quality of jobs a judge receives relatively
early in his career.31  According to (3.2), writing few opinions
(low OPINIONS/YR), having flunked the LRTI exam more often (high
FLUNKS), and having joined the YJL all lead to longer stints in
branch offices.  Just as interestingly, having gotten a very good
first job (1
ST_TOKYO) and gone to a top undergraduate college
(ELITE_U) are insignificant.  Starting high does not mean a judge
avoids branch office time entirely.
                                                            
30 The coefficient on YJL is insignificant for a simple reason.  A
conservative group first located and widely disseminated the membership
roster of judges in 1969.  Unless the Secretariat had independent
evidence of a judge’s political incilinations before it hired him, it
could not have discriminated against judges in their first posting.
Because the League kept the membership roster secret after 1969, we do
not have the names of any League members who joined the courts after
that date.  Accordingly, our regressions could not disclose any
discrimination against them.
31 Obviously, some judges are more senior than others during this
period.  We say “relatively early” only for the simple reason that for
each judge, it is the decade earlier than in our next set of
regressions.  Note that OPINIONS/YR cannot technically be a determinant
of either PREGOODJOB or PREBADJOB, since it is calculated over the same
period.  We use it here on the theory that it proxies for the judge’s
general rate of published productivity.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 25
Curiously, the coefficient on SENIORITY in significant and
positive:  in the PREBADJOB regression, more senior judges spent
more time in branch offices during the decade before the tax
opinions.  Note that this contradicts the more general result --
seen in the Table 4 regressions -- that length of time in branch
office generally declines with seniority.  What Regression (3.2)
reflects, however, is the non-linearity in this relationship:
branch office is generally a mid-career phenomenon.  The very
youngest judges avoid branch office time because they are too
inexperienced to be left alone in a small office.  Only after
judges have worked several years (often a decade) at the courts
do they start to be sent to branch offices -- and it is at that
point that branch office time starts to function as a potential
punishment.
Because the Regression (3.2) uses PREBADJOB as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on SENIORITY pimarily reflects the
early-to-mid-career transition -- a point at which branch office
time increases.  To capture the different effect that SENIORITY
has on junior and senior judges, we transformed SENIORITY into
exponential form.  Estimating that the break occurs shortly after
a judge finishes his first 10-year term, we constructed a
variable equal to (SENIORITY - 13) squared, and reran regression
(3.2) (on PREBADJOB) and regression (4.3a) (on POSTBADJOB).  InRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 26
both cases, the coefficient on the transformed variable was now
negative and statistically significant.32
Regression (3.3) illustrates the determinants of the most
prestigious mid-career jobs.33  We see that writing many opinions
(OPINIONS/YR), starting in the Tokyo District Court (1
ST_TOKYO),
and having considerable experience (SENIORITY) help, while having
attended an elite college (ELITE_UNIV), passed the LRTI quickly
(FLUNKS), or joined the YJL are insignificant for the prestigious
appointments.  In fact, however, a judge who graduated from an
elite university or passed the LRTI exam early is more likely
eventually to obtain prestigious appointments.  The effect is
simply later and indirect.  We know from Regression (3.1) that
university affiliation and LRTI early passage help one obtain an
initial posting to the Tokyo District Court.  As Regression
(4.3b) shows, that initial posting will in turn lead to
prestigious appointments later.  Indeed, at that point ELITE_UNIV
and FLUNKS reappear with independent statistical significance
even holding constant the effect of 1
ST_TOKYO.
                    
32 Xxx Done in OLS, check in Tobit.
33 We would not necessarily expect this to be symmetric to the
results in (3.2), since the qualities that prevent one from being posted
to the very worst jobs are not necessarily those which make one fit for
the very best.  That a judge is clearly not destined for the Supreme
Court does not mean he is good for nothing more than traffic cases.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 27
Table 3:
Early and Intermediate Judicial Careers
Dependent            (3.1)     (3.2)              (3.3)
Variable           1
ST_TOKYO       PREBADJOB          PREGOODJOB  
SENIORITY XXXXXX        .019**            .046**
       (5.46)            (12.90)
FLUNKS -.16**       .024**         -.007    
(2.16) (2.93)      (0.87)
ELITE_UNIV .89**       -.074        .077
(2.67) (1.40)  (1.61)
1
ST TOKYO XXXXXX      .010 .22**
       (0.13)    (3.02)
OPINIONS/YR XXXX      -.072**       .016**
    .    (5.56)    (2.44)
YJL -.45      .20** -.11
(0.77) (2.22)      (1.27)
Intercept -1.73**    -.21**      -.77**
(4.99)  (2.95)   (9.30)      .
Pseudo R2: .05        .20          .58
Standard
Error:            XXXXX             .37          .32
Censoring
(y<0, unc.,y>1)   XXXXX           (211,124,0)      (202,129,4) .
Notes:
Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses below.
** Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-sided test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level for a two-sided test.
n = 335.
Regressions (3.2) and (3.3) use tobit; Regression (3.1) uses
logit.34
                    
34 XxxxReplace the logit regression with probit for nomral
distirubiton and better comparability with the tobits.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 28
Table 4:
The Effect of Tax Opinions on Judicial Careers
(4.1a) (4.1b) (4.2a) (4.2b) (4.3a) (4.3b)
Dependent POST POST POST POST POST POST
Variable:      BADJOB   GOODJOB  BADJOB   GOODJOB  BADJOB   GOODJOB
ANYPROTP .037 -.011 XXXXX XXXXX -.003  .043
(0.64) (0.13) (0.05) (0.48)
ANYREV XXXX XXXXX .20** -.28*  .20** -.30**
(2.24) (1.96) (2.14) (2.02)
PREGOODJOB XXXX -.078 XXXXX -.070 XXXXX -.076
(0.42) (0.39) (0.43)
PREBADJOB .051 XXXXX .019 XXXXX .018  XXXXX
(0.72)   (.14)   (.13)
SENIORITY -.015**  .047** -.016**  .048** -.016**  .049**
(4.32) (7.57) (4.66) (7.84) (4.63) (7.85)
FLUNKS .016*  -.012*  .016* -.024 .016* -.024*
(1.66) (1.70) (1.72) (1.62) (1.71) (1.66)
ELITE_UNIV -.050 .072   -.060 .14* -.060 .14*
(0.90) (1.55) (1.09) (1.79) (1.09) (1.75)
1ST_TOKYO -.25** .107* -.27** .24 -.27** .24*
(2.45) (1.73) (2.61) (1.65) (2.61) (1.85)
OPINIONS/YR -.014 .014** -.011 .014 -.010 .012
(1.27) (1.35) (0.98) (1.08) (0.93) (0.87)
YJL .13** -.073 .13 -.13 .13 -.13
(1.23) (-.84) (1.27) (0.88) (1.27) (0.88)
Intercept .30** -.43** .30** -.43** .31** -.44**
(4.26) (3.68) (4.47) (3.74) (4.43) (3.77)     .Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 29
Pseudo R2: .21 .33 .23 .34 .23 .34
Standard
Errors: .32 .45 .31 .45 .31 .44
Censoring
(y<0, y>1)    76,0 76,18  76,0   76,18    76,0      76,18.
Notes:
Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses below.
** Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-sided test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level for a two-sided test.
n = 179.
The regressions use tobit.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.  Tax cases. -- a.  Introduction.  Turn, now to the
question central to this article:  whether a judge’s tax
decisions affect his career.  Table 4 shows the regression
results for the Tax Trials sample.  Regressions (4.1a) and (4.1b)
examine the effect of writing any pro-taxpayer opinions
(ANYPROTP).  Regressions (4.2a) and (4.2b) examine the effect of
writing opinions that are reversed (ANYREV).  Regressions (4.3a)
and (4.3b) repeat the regressions but include both ANYPROTP and
ANYREV.  We focus here on the (4.3) regressions.
b.  Control variables.  As discussed earlier, the best
positions go to the most senior judges:  SENIORITY is positively
and significantly correlated with POSTBADJOB, and negatively and
significantly correlated with POSTGOODJOB.
In a variety of ways, the regressions once more confirm the
importance of intelligence and hard work.  Judges placedRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 30
initially on the fast-track disproportionately obtain the best
jobs:  1ST_TOKYO is negatively and significantly correlated with
POSTBADJOB and positively and significantly correlated with
POSTGOODJOB.  Judges who failed the LRTI entrance exam the fewest
times also obtain good jobs:  FLUNKS is positively and
significantly correlated with POSTBADJOB and negatively and
significantly correlated with POSTGOODJOB.
One variable also illustrates that what produces an
exceptionally good career may not be simply the opposite of what
produces an exceptionally bad career.  Judges from the schools
with the most brutally competitive entrance examinations hold the
most administrative responsibilities but do not avoid branch
office time:  ELITE_UNIV is positively and significantly
correlated with POSTGOODJOB, but not significantly negatively
correlated with POSTBADJOB.35
Notably, FLUNKS and ELITE_UNIV maintain a continuing
significance in regression (4.3b) wholly apart from the separate
effect of 1ST_TOKYO.  Given that the Secretariat decided who to
put on the fast track on the basis of observable proxies for
intelligence and effort, one might have thought that the presence
                    
35 The perceptive reader will notice that PREGOODJOB did not have
a significant correlation with ELITE_UNIV, unlike POSTGOODJOB.  This
suggests an interaction between ELITE_UNIV and seniority—the usefulness
of going to a top college may be greatest at the start of a career (as
shown in Regression 3.1) and at the end (from 4.3b).  Note, of course,
that even PREGOODJOB depends on 1
ST-TOKYO, and 1
ST-TOKYO
disproportionately includes judges from elite schools.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 31
of 1ST_TOKYO in the regressions would swamp FLUNKS and
ELITE_UNIV.  Despite the modest collinearity (1ST_TOKYO's
correlation in the Tax Trials sample with ELITE_UNIV is .09 and
with FLUNKS is -.12; the correlation between the latter two is -
.15), all three remain independently significant.36
We predicted that judges who were members of the leftist YJL
in 1969 would still work disproportionately in branch offices in
the 1980s.  YJL is positively correlated with POSTBADJOB and
negatively with POSGOODJOB, but the effect is not statistically
significant.
b.  ANYPROTP.  Finally, we come to the variables of greatest
importance to our hypotheses explaining the high government win
rates.  In short:  ANYPROTP has no significant effect in the
regressions, while ANYREV does.  Whether a judge writes a pro-
taxpayer opinion has no significant effect on the jobs he obtains
in the succeeding years.  Even the signs are not consistently in
the directions predicted.  Given the possibility that judges who
write pro-taxpayer opinions write them regularly, and that
PREGOODJOB and PREBADJOB would then incorporate the punishment
imposed for past pro-taxpayer opinions -- given this possibility,
we reran the (4.3) regressions with PREBADJOB and PREGOODJOB
                    
36 That the effect of elite school graduation would continue
beyond the initial appointment contradicts our conclusion in Ramseyer &
Rasmusen, supra note 2 (1997), at 276-77.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 32
omitted.  Notwithstanding the change, ANYPROTP remained
insignificant.37
Whether a higher court reverses a judge's opinion does
affect his career:  the coefficient on ANYREV is negative and
significant in the POSTGOODJOB regression; and positive and
significant in the POSTBADJOB regression.38  Thus, it does not
matter whether a judge decides for the taxpayer or for the
government.  It does matter whether he decides correctly.39
Hypothetically, the “no observed punishment” on ANYPROTP
result is equally consistent with an equilibrium-with-punishment
story.  In this story, the Secretariat would punish judges for
anything more than a trivially pro-taxpayer cases.  Because all
judges anticipate the punishment, however, no one writes
                    
37 Xx Done in OLS; please check in Tobit.
Perhaps the mot serious missing variable problem concerns
docket-clearance rates.  We have no data on the ability of judges to
clear the docket -- yet suspect that it does significantly affect
careers.  Here, however, the effect works in our advantage.  In general,
we suspect that judges who clear the docket fastest are those most
inclined to rubber-stamp the government.  If so, then the ANYPROTP
judges will tend to be judges who clear the docket more slowly.  If so,
then including the hypothetical variable on docket clearance would
lessen any punishment incoporated in the ANYPROTP coefficient.
38 The correlation between ANYREV and ANYPROTP is .34.
39 By the logic behind Priest-Klein, if both parties agree that a
decision issued by a trial court is wrong, they will not appeal.
Instead, they will settle out of court by reference to the expected
reversal on appeal.  As a result, the lack of an appeal is no evidence
that a trial judge decided correctly.  An actual reversal on appeal,
however, is relatively clear-cut evidence that other judges believe that
the trial court was wrong.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 33
seriously pro-taxpayer opinions and no one is punished.
Hypothetically -- but we think not realistically.
We think the equilibrium unlikely, for the simple reason
that the rest of the judicial system seems so wildly out of
equilibrium.  Recall the results we summarized at the outset:
judges who join leftist groups are visibly punished, judges who
decide electoral cases against the ruling party are punished,
judges who acquit criminal defendants are punished -- indeed,
according to the data here, even judges who find their opinions
reversed are punished.  Given that some opinions themselves seem
more than trivially pro-taxpayer, and given that in other corners
of the judiciary the Secretariat does punish judges -- given all
that, we doubt that the threatened-punishment equilibrium
explains the no-punishment-on-ANYPROTP results.
c.  Appeals.  We are not done, though.  Might it be that
what matters for a judge is not being reversed, but being
reversed when he favors the taxpayer?  Maybe a judge’s mistakes
are not penalized when those mistakes favor the government.
Maybe he suffers only when he mistakenly favors taxpayers.
Because our Tax Trials data base has too few cases appealed to
test this proposition, we turn to our augmented Tax Appeals
sample.
The Tax Appeals data base includes only judges whose cases
were appealed to a higher court.  Of those, the great majorityRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 34
were pro-government opinions that were upheld by the higher
court, so we will use that as our base situation and omit the
variable J_AFF from our regressions.  We are interested, however,
in whether the other variables -- J_REV, TP_AFF, and TP_REV --
have a significant effect.  Table 5 shows the results.
The results in Table 5 surprised us.  Only one of our new
variables is significantly different from the J_AFF base:
TP_AFF, which has the wrong sign!  It seems that a judge who
rules in favor of the taxpayer, has the case appealed, but is
sustained on appeal actually reduces his chances of going to a
branch office.  Perhaps we should not be surprised, however.  For
a judge to rule against the government, particularly in a case
controversial enough to be appealed, requires a measure of self-
confidence and initiative.  The safest course for a judge is to
always rule for the government, the typical correct decision.  If
a judge rules for the taxpayer and his reasoning is affirmed by a
higher court, this probably reflects considerable intellectual
ability.  Consistent with this, compare the correlation
coefficients of J_AFF and TP_AFF with several proxies for ability
(along with politics and experience):
               J_AFF     TP_AFF
OPINIONS/YR -.21  .32
1ST_TOKYO -.12  .05
ELITE_UNIV -.11  .16
SENIORITY -.07  .07
FLUNK  .09 -.05
YJL  .02 -.06
PREGOODJOB -.13  .12Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 35
For each of the variables, the judges writing TP_AFF opinions
seem a more talented (also more experienced and politically
conservative) group.  Again, the Secretariat seems not to be
trying just to help the government win; it seems simply to be
rewarding talent.Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 36
Table 5:
The Effect of Tax Opinions on Judicial Careers
Dependent           (5.1a)                  (5.1b)
Variable:              POSTBADJOB                POSTGOODJOB
TP_AFF                   -.15*                   .056      
                         (1.89)                 (0.54)
TP_REV                   -.087                   .12      
                         (1.31)                 (1.37)
J_REV                     .020                  -.12       
                         (0.28)                 (1.31)
PREGOODJOB            XXXX                   .09
                                                (0.48)
PREBADJOB                 .40**                XXXXXXXX
                         (3.07)
SENIORITY                -.015**                .043**
                         (5.37)                 (7.90)
FLUNKS                   .0061                 -.020*
                         (0.81)                 (1.76)     
ELITE_UNIV              -.016                  .050
                         (0.33)                 (0.76)
1ST_TOKYO               -.32**                  .25**
                         (4.03)                 (2.68)
OPINIONS/YR             -.0028                   .021*   
                         (0.29)                 (1.92)
YJL                     -.19*                    .068
                        (1.88)                  (0.57)
Intercept               .32**                  -.43**
                        (5.63)                  (4.80)Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 37
Pseudo R2:             .20                      .34
Standard
Error:         .33                      .45
Censoring
(y<0,unc. y>1)    (121.0, 163.0, 0)   (118.3, 132.8, 32.9)
Notes:
Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses below.
** Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-sided test.
*  Significant at the 10 percent level for a two-sided test.
n = 284.  The regressions use  tobit, with observations
weighted by the inverse of the sampling probability.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
III.  Political Economy
Although the Japanese government consistently wins in court,
it does not win because it manipulates judges’ career paths.
Simply put, the Secretariat does not punish judges for writing
pro-taxpayer opinions; instead, it punishes them for writing
opinions that are wrong.  Given the institutional structure of
the courts, the LDP could have manipulated incentives to increase
government revenue.  According to the data from tax opinions, it
does not.
Given the apparent gains from skewing judicial outcomes,
perhaps the puzzle is why the government chose not to manipulate
the courts.  After all, as we show elsewhere it does reward
judges who convict criminal defendants, judges who avoid left-
wing entanglements, or judges who favor the government in some
constitutional cases.  The answer, we suggest, lies partly in theRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 38
LDP's long-term dominance and partly in the LDP's internal
structure.
First, as what appeared to be the long-term majority party
in a parliamentary regime, the LDP could readily change laws it
did not like.40  If it wanted the tax office to raise more
revenue, it could straightforwardly accomplish that result by
statute.  It could either impose by statute the desired judicial
interpretation, or simply raise tax rates.  It had no need to
rely on aggressive judicial interpretation
Given the ease of making major changes by statute, the
government had no need to intervene in the courts to raise its
take.  What it needed was the ability to make minor context-
specific changes in the law as applied.  Broad changes in revenue
it could engineer through legislation.  For more nuanced changes,
it could rely on regulations and precedent:  where precision
mattered, it presumably turned to regulations and internal
circulars; where factual context mattered, it selected the
appropriate cases for litigation and relied on the courts.
Second, the LDP maintained an internal structure that
enabled it to commit to long-term strategies.  Like voters
elsewhere, all else equal41 voters in Japan prefer unbiased
                    
40 In what was a dramatic surprise to most observers, the LDP did
lose power in 1993.  On the internal party dynamics that led to this
perhaps-temporary fall from power, see J.M. Ramseyer & F.M. Rosenbluth,
supra note. 11
41 All else is not always equal -- as, for example, if given
objective probabilities an acquital in a criminal case would result in aRamseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 39
courts.  Yet given how long it can take to verify whether
politicians intervene in courts, a political party unable to
commit credibly to long-term strategies might well intervene
anyway.  The move would generate for it a large long-term net
cost (from voter disaffection) but a modest short-term advantage
(from more government revenue).
Crucially, the internal structure of the LDP facilitated
commitment to long-term strategies.42  The party drew its leaders
from legislators who showed that they could win elections
repeatedly.  In exchange for their running the party, the party
paid them lavish amounts of cash -- some of it legal, some of it
not.  In effect, it delegated power to those members who most
clearly played an indefinitely repeated game; then, to ensure
that they not defect from strategies that maximized the gains to
the party as a whole, it paid them efficiency wages.43
IV.  Conclusion
Consistently, the Japanese government wins in court.  It
does not win, we conclude, because it manipulates the career
judiciary to produce biased courts.  Japanese judges do not enjoy
                                                            
guilty defendant walking free.  See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 2
(1998).
42 Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, supra note 11, at ch. 5.
43 On efficiency wages, see George Akerlof and Janet Yellen, eds.,
Efficiency Wages Models of the Labor Market, or the more modest, and
perhaps falsified, contribution by one of us explaining why paying high
wages to politicians discourages stealing (Eric Rasmusen, An Income
Satiation Model of Efficiency Wages, 30 Economic Inquiry 467 [1992]).Ramseyer & Rasmusen:  Page 40
better careers if they favor the government.  Instead, it
apparently wins because, as a rational repeat player, it
disproportionately selects for litigation those cases that will
shift precedent in an advantageous direction.  At least in the
context of tax litigation, the system favors accurate judges
rather than biased judges.  Systematically, those judges who find
their opinions reversed on appeal do worse than their peers.
As majority party in the Japanese government, the LDP
probably left the courts alone in this field because doing so
earned it a long-term advantage.  After all, if it needed to
raise revenue, it could simply change the statute.  By delegating
leadership to a corps of well-paid politicians who played an
indefinitely repeated game, the party was able to avoid
strategies (like judicial intervention) with a short-term
advantage but a possible net long-term cost.  Although it used a
career structure in the courts that would have facilitated
intervention to its short-term advantage, in this context it used
an internal party structure that facilitated commitment to safer
long-term strategies instead.